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Literature Review

Despite global tension and the fear of nuclear war, or perhaps because if it, the Cold War (1945-1992) was a time of at least surface peace, stability and cooperation. The world was divided into two unrelated and powerful spheres, the American sphere and the Soviet sphere. Within each sphere, alliances, based on self-regulating insecurity and fear in the face of the enemy camp, were stable and cooperative (even among old enemies). Between the spheres there was also stability and cooperation, based on the nuclear deterrent with its high stakes of war, a bipolar system of alliances, and on the lack of any familiarity or historic antagonisms between the two great powers. This bipolar alliance structure also afforded tolerance of defections and flexibility in limiting skirmishes and avoiding major confrontation (Gaddis, John.The Long Peace, Oxford University Press, New York 1987. p108,109). Although the differences between the political, cultural and economic nature of the two spheres is clearly revealed in differences of prosperity, liberty, limited government, rule of law, cultural development, etc. – these differences did not essentially effect the ongoing stability and cooperation of this bipolar world structure until the Soviet sphere broke down and the kind of stability and cooperation allowed by the Cold War ended.

Multipolar structures of power require subtle and able statesmen to manage the inherent intricacy and complicated shifting alliances reflecting that intricacy (Gaddis,p100). But the bipolar structure of the cold war permitted little margin for error to even wrongheaded or dense leaders (Gaddis, p109). This lucky arrangement proved much more enduring and stable than the well-intentioned aftermath of World War I and even more stable than the pre-World War I bipolar alliances of Germany and Austria-Hungary (Gaddis p107).

War requires deliberate calculations of benefit and cost. Optimism about the benefits and “anything that increases that optimism is a cause of war. Anything which dampens that optimism is a cause of peace” (Blarney p53 as quoted by Gaddis p120). Optimism is often misplaced. But during the Cold War there was no optimism about any benefits of a major confrontation between the great powers. Military crises since the end of World War II were contained by an exceeding caution against risking such a confrontation. “Iran, 1946; Greece, 1947; Berlin and Czechoslovakia, 1948; Korea, 1950; the East Berlin riots, 1953; the Hungarian uprising, 1956; Berlin again, 1958-59; the U2 incident, 1960; Berlin again, 1961; the Cuban missile crisis, 1962; Czechoslovakia again, 1958; the Yom Kippur war, 1973; Afghanistan, 1979; Poland, 1981; the Korean airlines incident, 1983…”(Gaddis p121) were all occasions which, under other circumstances, might have escalated into world war.

The nuclear deterrent must have been the major reason for this unusual caution and the lack of optimism about the outcome of such a war (Gaddis, p121). The nuclear risk was the major root of the pessimistic perception of war between the two powers of the Cold War. Hiroshima and Nagasake were vivid evidence of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and contributed to the pessimistic view of a war between nuclear powers and therefore contributed to the stability and peace of the Cold War (Gaddis, p121). This pessimism about outcome encouraged the great powers to limit crises and risks taken by third parties. The consequences of major war were so concentrated on the two great powers that they had every incentive to control a crisis that might instigate such a war. This concentration of enormously harmful consequences on the two great powers, which would surely have included as a target the leaders in their capitols, had a very sobering effect.

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Phin Upham is a New York based author and blogger. His writing has appeared on blogs like The Academic Ledger. Click here to read more articles from author Phin Upham.